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SUMMARY In 2006 EPCglobal and the International Or-
ganization for Standards (ISO) ratified the EPC Class-1
Generation-2 (Gen-2) [1] and the ISO 18000-6C standards [2],
respectively. These efforts represented major advancements in
the direction of universal standardization for low-cost RFID tags.
However, a cause for concern is that security issues do not seem
to be properly addressed. In this paper, we propose a new
lightweight RFID tag-reader mutual authentication scheme for
use under the EPCglobal framework. The scheme is based on
previous work by Konidala and Kim [3]. We attempt to miti-
gate the weaknesses observed in the original scheme and, at the
same time, consider other possible adversarial threats as well as
constraints on low-cost RFID tags requirements.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we focus on designing a secure authen-
tication scheme for use under the EPCglobal frame-
work. A number of previous works, such as [3], [4] and
[5], have proposed protocols to enhance the security
of the EPC Class-1 Gen-2 standard. Unfortunately,
due to some weaknesses later exposed, these protocols
fall short of meeting the desired security objectives.
It looks like enforcing authentication under the EPC
Class-1 Gen-2 standard specifications is an almost im-
possible task, and any proposed scheme to day that
was based on it has been doomed and failed. In fact,
the proposed infrastructure seems to be too weak to
be able to support any real security. However we con-
tend that, by making some small enhancements and
without the need to revamp the entire set of specifica-
tions, it is still possible to reach a reasonable trade-off
in designing a reasonably secure authentication scheme
for low-cost RFID tags. Readers should note that the
proposed scheme is not fully secure as tags’ passwords
conforming to Gen-2 specification are only 32-bits long.
However, the proposed scheme can be considered prac-
tically secure for the vast majority of intended applica-
tions, such as baggage and tire tracking. Basically, it
†Delft University of Technology (TU-Delft), Information
and Communication Theory group (ICT), P.O. Box 5031
2600 GA, Delft, The Netherlands
††Institute for Infocomm Research, A*STAR Singapore
†††School of Computing Science, Buckingham Building,
Lion Terrace, Portsmouth PO1 3HE, United Kingdom
DOI: 10.1587/transinf.E0.D.1
is a trade off between security and tag’s price. The us-
age of standard cryptography could increment security
but hardware requirements (circuit area, memory and
power consumption) would be much larger, resulting in
a higher cost that basically rules out these kind of cryp-
tographically stronger solutions for low-cost transpon-
ders.
A tag-reader mutual authentication scheme that
uses a specially designed MixBits function is pre-
sented in this work. The underlying protocol is sim-
ilar to that proposed by Konidala and Kim in [3] (we
shall refer in the following to their scheme as the tag-
reader mutual authentication or TRMA scheme), with
its observed weaknesses addressed by introducing the
MixBits function. Under some rigorous analysis, we
show that MixBits increases the security of the scheme
by providing stronger resistance against common at-
tacks. Furthermore, we show that MixBits requires
only a small amount of circuit area, memory size, and
power consumption and can be feasibly implemented
even on low-cost RFID tags.
2. Background
An RFID system is composed of three main com-
ponents. Readers (transceivers) interrogate tags
(transponders) to access the information stored in their
memory. Afterwards, they pass this acquired informa-
tion to a back-end database which employs it as a search
index to allocate all the information associated with the
target tag. Readers and tags use the radio channel for
communication, which is commonly assumed to be in-
secure. On the other hand, as readers and the back-end
database are computationally much more powerful than
tags, a secure channel is commonly assumed.
RFID technology may be envisioned as the substi-
tute of barcodes. However, the massive adoption of this
technology is being delayed due its associated security
threats. A number of research papers addressing RFID
security and privacy problems have been published in
the existing literature (we refer the reader to [6], [7] for
a detailed survey on this topic).
Our interest here is on RFID tag-reader mutual au-
thentication protocols. Among the numerous authenti-
cation protocols that have been proposed, a number of
them rely on the usage of classic cryptographic prim-
Copyright c© 200x The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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itives, such as symmetric block/stream ciphers, hash
functions, etc. In this paper, we focus on designing a
lightweight authentication protocol for use under the
EPCglobal Framework. Our objective is to feature a
small gate count, memory size and power consumption
for the implementation of security functions on a low-
cost RFID tag. Such a restriction implies that we would
have to do without classic cryptographic primitives.
Based on the EPC Class-1 Gen-2 standard speci-
fications [1], an RFID tag that is compliant with the
standard must implement the following: 1) A 32-bit se-
cret access password that is used to control access to
the tag’s memory; 2) A 32-bit secret kill password that
is used to kill (i.e. permanently disable) the tag; 3)
a 16-bit pseudo-random number generator; 4) a 16-bit
cyclic redundancy checksum.
Furthermore, a simple cover-codding technique is
used to protect Access and Kill password. Specifically,
the tag and the reader exchange three messages: 1) The
reader sends a request message to the tag; 2) The tag
backscatters a random number; 3) The received value
is xored with the Access/Kill password and sends the
result to the tag. 4) Finally, the tag checks the cor-
rectness of the password. The security of the above
procedure is extremely weak, so performing a passive
attack is very simple. An attacker listening in to the
backward (tag-to-reader) and forward (reader-to-tag)
channel (a very realistic assumption when using the air
channel) can pick up the random number sent by the
tag. Then the attacker can decrypt the ciphertext sent
by the reader by performing an XOR operation (addi-
tion modulo 2) with the previous eavesdropped random
number. So the Access/Kill password can be obtained
by this quite simple mechanism. A detailed analysis of
Gen-2 specification can be found in [8].
3. Related Work
We summarize the most important proposals that at-
tempt to rectify the security flaws presented in Gen-2
standard whilst are as best in conformance to this spec-
ification.
In [10], Juels et al. examined various ways for
RFID tags to perform cryptographic functions while
remaining EPC-C1G2 compliant. Their main idea is to
take an expansive view of EPC tag memory. Instead
of considering memory merely as a storage medium,
they use it as an input/output way of interfacing with a
cryptographic module within the tag. Read/write com-
mands may therefore involve cryptographic values, such
as messages in a challenge-response protocol. Their
work clearly shows the need for mutual authentication
between readers and tags. However, the assumption
that a low-cost tag might support on-board crypto-
graphic modules is unrealistic, at least at present time.
Karthikeyan and Nesterenko [11] proposed an effi-
cient tag identification and reader authentication pro-
tocol based on a simple XOR and matrix operations.
Two matrices and a key are stored in both the tag (K,
M1, M
−1
2 ) and the back-end database (K, M
−1
1 , M2).
Once the tag is identified, the reader sends to the tag
messages Y, Z. The first is used to authenticate the
tag and the second to update the key. However, an
attacker can substitute the original Z by a random Z’.
Upon receiving Y, Z ′, the tag will be authenticated and
will wrongly update the key. So the legitimate reader
and the tag will not be able to authenticate each other
any more. Additionally, the protocol is vulnerable to
replay attacks, and privacy location is not guaranteed
[5].
Duc et al. [4] proposed a tag-to-back-end database
authentication protocol. The security of Duc et al.’s
protocol is based on key synchronization between tags
and the back-end database. The last message of the
protocol consists of an EndSession command, which
is sent to both tags and readers. Interception of one
of these messages will cause a synchronization loss be-
tween the tag and the server. The tag and the reader
will then be no longer able to authenticate, which is an
extremely serious problem. The protocol also presents
backward secrecy problems, as compromise of the Elec-
tronic Product Code (EPC) allows an attacker to trace
back all previous communications.
Chienet al. pointed out certain weaknesses in the
schemes [11] and [4], and then proposed a new EPC-
C1G2 compliant mutual authentication protocol [5].
However, Peris et al. [12] showed how none of the ob-
jectives are met, as it is vulnerable to attacks includ-
ing identity impersonation, non-forward security and
tracking. Execution of the protocol itself even produces
de-synchronization between the tags and the back-end
database.
In [3], Konidola and Kim produced an interesting
paper which tried to correct some of the security short-
comings of the EPC-C1G2 specification. The authors
hold that the proposed tag-reader mutual authentica-
tion scheme (TRMA scheme in short) frustrates the
access password acquisition using a simple XOR op-
eration, in contrast to what happens in the specifica-
tion. However, Lim and Li [9] showed how a passive
attacker can recover the tag’s password by eavesdrop-
ping over a single run of the protocol and perform-
ing correlation analysis on the captured information.
Konidala and Kim then proposed a new version of the
TRMA scheme (TRMA+) in which the tag access and
kill passwords are used for authentication. The ex-
tended TRMA scheme offers greater resistance against
Lim and Li’s attacks. It is much more difficult for an
adversary to recover the access password under the cor-
relation attack, or to forge a successful authentication
under the dictionary attack. However, Peris-Lopez et
al. showed how the access password can be disclosed
under the assumption of an active attacker [16]. In ad-
dition, Lim et al. exposed that the correlation attack
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Fig. 1 The TRMA authentication protocol.
can be used against this scheme in a different way –
to recover the kill password after eavesdropping over
multiple authentication sessions [17].
Other recent proposals have resulted a vain at-
tempt as shown in [13] and [14].
4. The TRMA Schemes
In this section, we briefly describe the original TRMA
scheme, as well as the extended TRMA scheme.
4.1 The Original TRMA Scheme
In [3], Konidala and Kim presented a lightweight tag-
reader mutual authentication (TRMA) scheme that
uses some of the features in a EPC Class-1 Gen-2 tag,
as well as a specially designed pad generation function
PadGen.
The PadGen function is used to produce a cover-
coding pad to mask the tag’s access password before
transmission. The function is performed on the tag’s
32-bit access password PWD, which is broken up into
2 parts – PWDM (comprising the 16 most significant
bits) and PWDL (comprising the 16 least significant
bits). PadGen takes two 16-bit random numbers RTagi
(generated by the tag) and RRdri (generated by the
reader) as its inputs. Using each of the four hexadeci-
mal digits in RTagi (or R
Rdr
i ) to indicate a bit address
within PWDM or PWDL, PadGen then selects those
bits from PWDM and PWDL to form the 16-bit out-
put pad (see the original paper for details [3]).
Under the scheme, each cover-coding pad PADi
(for i = 1, 2, 3, 4) can be expressed as





and the authentication responses (otherwise known as
the cover-coded passwords in [3] and [15]) can be ex-
pressed as
CCP{1,3} = PWDM ⊕ PAD{1,3} (2)
CCP{2,4} = PWDL ⊕ PAD{2,4} (3)
Fig. 1 depicts a single run of the authentication
protocol.
4.2 The Extended TRMA Scheme
In [15], Konidala, Kim and Kim presented an extended
version of TRMA, which uses both the 32-bit access
password and the 32-bit kill password. The TRMA+
scheme uses the same message exchange but consumes
two rounds of PadGen (instead of a single round in the
original TRMA scheme), one nested within the other,
to compute each cover-coding pad. The inner round
performs PadGen over the access password, while the
outer round performs PadGen over the kill password.
Instead of (1), the resulting pad would then be ex-
pressed as
PADi = PadGen(KWD,





where KWD denotes the kill password.
5. M3 Authentication Protocol (M3AP)
In this section, we introduce a new lightweight authen-
tication scheme, known as M3AP, to strengthen the se-
curity of the EPC Class-1 Gen-2 standard. We design
M3AP by extending Konidala and Kim’s scheme [3],
and make use of a MixBits function to mitigate the
security weaknesses found in the original scheme.
5.1 Objectives
With M3AP, we emphasize that the main objective is
to design a simple, cost-effective, lightweight and prac-
tical authentication protocol that provides mutual au-
thentication between an RFID tag and an RFID reader
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under the EPCglobal framework. Privacy is not a main
objective like in Gen-2 specification. Hence, as in the
authentication protocol specified under the Gen-2 stan-
dard and the previously proposed TRMA protocols, we
do not make provisions to enforce privacy by protecting
the unique EPC but instead, allow the EPC of RFID
tags to be transmitted in clear. Inevitably, this poses a
problem to application environments whereby the pri-
vacy of tags and/or tag users is essential. In such cases,
it would be pertinent to include measures for privacy
protection. While our current scheme does not enforce
privacy, we contend that it would be possible to ex-
tend the scheme to provide the necessary protection
although this would require additional considerations.
5.2 The Protocol
In this section, we present an improved version of
Konidala and Kim’s TRMA scheme that seeks to mit-
igate its security weaknesses. The proposed protocol
was designed by taking into account tag restrictions
(computational, storage and circuitry) and with mini-
mal modifications to the general framework of the Gen-
2 specification.
Assumptions: Each tag has two passwords (i.e. ac-
cess -PWD- and kill -KWD- password), and is able to
generate 16-bit random values and to compute check-
sum values. According to the set of operations sup-
ported on-chip, transponders make use of bitwise XOR
operation, PadGen function defined in [3], and the
specific-defined MixBits function.
We assume that the tag is singulated using a prob-
abilistic (e.g. Aloha-based protocol) or deterministic
(e.g. binary tree-walking protocol) collision avoidance
protocol. At the end of each singulation, a tag is se-
lected to communicate with the reader.
The protocol is described as follows:






The tag backscatters its EPC number. Then, the reader
sends the command Req RN to the tag over four times.
Each time, the tag backscatters a new random num-
ber (RTagi for i = {1, 2, 3, 4}) and stores it into its
memory. These are used as random challenges to the
reader. Upon receiving the EPC, the reader uses it
to perform an index search to retrieve the access pass-
word PWD associated with the tag from the backend
database. Once PWD is obtained, the reader will then
go on to compute the authentication responses.








The reader transmits its computed responses, as well
as a set of random numbers as authentication chal-
lenges to the tag. To obtain the responses CCP1 and
CCP2, it first computes an intermediate 32-bit vector
PWD′ from PWD and the received random challenges
{RTagi }
4
i=1 by using our proposed MixBits function:






The reader then computes the authentication responses
CCP1 and CCP2 as follows:


















Instead of applying PadGen to the static access pass-
word, we apply PadGen on a vector computed from
the access password. This vector changes as the ran-
dom challenges vary. Furthermore, both CCP1 and
CCP2 depend only on the random challenges gener-
ated by the tag. In the original and extended TRMA
schemes, CCP1 and CCP2 would partially depend
on pseudo-random numbers generated by the reader,
which presents an avenue for a malicious reader to ex-
ploit and reduces the reliability of the responses com-
puted. After computing the responses, the reader
then generates four new random numbers (RRdri for
i = {1, 2, 3, 4}) and presents them as challenges to
the tag. The reader also stores the random challenges,
which will be used to verify the tag responses.
(3) Tag : Verify CCP1 and CCP2 .
The tag receives CCP1 and CCP2. The access pass-
word and the random numbers used in the computation
of CCP1 and CCP2 are already stored in its memory.
Therefore, it has the necessary information to compute
CCP ′1 and CCP
′
2 in the same way that the reader com-
puted CCP1 and CCP2. The tag then compares these
values with the values sent by the reader:
1. If CCP1 = CCP
′
1 and CCP2 = CCP
′
2, then veri-
fication is successful. The tag considers the reader
to be an authorized entity.
2. Otherwise, verification fails. The tag ends its com-
munication with the reader and returns to arbi-
trate state.
(4) Tag → Reader : CCP3, CCP4
To authenticate itself, the tag needs to reply to the
reader with CCP3 and CCP4, which are computed by
taking steps similar to those taken by the reader. The
tag first computes an intermediate 32-bit vector from
its access password:
PWD′′ = MixBits(PWD′ ⊕ (RRdr1 || R
Rdr
2 ),
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(6) Verify CCP1, CCP2;
Proceed if success, abort if failure.
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(9) Verify CCP3, CCP4;
Proceed if success, abort if failure.




Thereafter, the tag computes CCP3 and CCP4 as fol-
lows (note that PadGen is now computed over the new
intermediate vector PWD′′):


















The tag then sends the two authentication responses
(CCP3, CCP4) to the reader.
(5) Reader : Verify CCP3 and CCP4 .
The reader receives the responses CCP3 and CCP4
from the tag, computes CCP ′3 and CCP
′
4 based on the
information known to it, and then compares the re-
ceived values with the computed values:
1. If CCP3 = CCP
′
3 and CCP4 = CCP
′
4, then veri-
fication is successful. The reader considers the tag
as an authentic (or genuine) tag.
2. Otherwise, verification fails. The reader will emit
an alarm to the back-end database to indicate this
event (perhaps to inform the database that a fake
tag or a counterfeit product is detected).
Fig. 2 depicts a single run of the authentication
protocol.
6. The MixBits Function
RFID tags (e.g. EPCglobal Class I or Class II tags)
are devices with severe limitations (in terms of com-
putational, storage and circuitry requirements). Due
to these hard restrictions, the use of standard crypto-
graphic primitives lies beyond their capabilities. Hence,
the design of a secure lightweight MixBits function for
our M3AP protocol becomes a stimulating challenge.
We contend that the basic requirements of this func-
tion should be as follows:
1. Only efficient operations that are easily imple-
mented in hardware should be used. For exam-
ple, rotations may be included, but multiplications
should be excluded due to their high cost [18].
2. Triangular functions [20] (e.g. bitwise operations
or addition mod N ) and non-triangular functions
(e.g. rotations) should be combined to prune sim-
ple linear cryptanalysis [21].
3. A highly non-linear function that provides a negli-
gible relationship between the inputs and the out-
puts, should be used.
4. Temporal requirements will limit the number of
operations a tag may compute. The read speed
of a tag conforming to Gen-2 is about twice that
of Gen-1, with average read rates of around 450
tags per second [1]. Additionally, power consump-
tion also restricts the total account of operations
consumed.
We obtain possible candidates for MixBits
through evolving compositions of extremely light
operands by means of genetic programming. We refer
the interested reader to [22] where a detailed descrip-
tion of the methodology used to obtain our function
is explained. Several experiments are then conducted
on the candidates to pick the best highly non-linear
function. At the end of the experiments, the following
function is selected for MixBits, which conforms to all
the aforementioned requirements. Inputs (X and Y )
and output (Z) are 32-bits of length and the function




for(i=0; i<32; i++) {
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Z = (Z<<1) + ((Z+Y)>>1);}
----------------------------
where addition is carried out modulo 232, << denotes
bitwise left shift and >> denotes bitwise right shift.
7. Analysis of the MixBits Function
In this section, we cryptanalyze the proposed func-
tion and conduct an statistical analysis over is output.
Then, we estimate the hardware requirements to its
implementation and analyze the throughput provided
by this function. Finally, MixBits is compared with
several lightweight primitives.
7.1 Security Analysis
Linear cryptanalysis, commonly used for block cipher
cryptanalysis, is employed to study how the output of
this function can be approximated by a linear function.
In order to obtain a linear bias, the following experi-
ment is carried out: two 32-bit masks (A, B) are ran-
domly picked, and two consecutive outputs (Zi, Zi+1)
are generated from them. With these two masks, the
equality A ∗ Zi = B ∗ Zi+1 is evaluated (∗ denotes
scalar product, with a mod 2 operation carried out after
the addition). This process is repeated 2n times, from
which we obtain the number of successes (m). The bias










Several pairs of different masks A and B, are randomly
picked and tested. For each mask pair, 225 32-bit out-
puts are generated, and the expression A∗Zi = B∗Zi+1
is evaluated over them. To obtain these outputs, the X
and Y variables are initialized to random values in the
beginning and as the experiment runs, the X variable
remains unchanged (here, we attempt to consider a dis-
advantageous scenario) while the Y variable is set to a
new random value each time a new output is computed.
From the above experiment we can deduce that the bias
of the MixBits function is bounded by 2−11.13.
The serial correlation coefficients (at bit, byte and
4-byte level) are also studied to measure the extent to
which a new intermediate output Zi depends upon the
previous value Zi−1. To obtain a sizeable test sample,
224 Z outputs are computed. As in the above experi-
ment, the X and Y variables are randomly initialized
at the beginning, and the Y variable is set to a new ran-
dom value each time a new output is computed. Fur-
ther analysis on the XOR (Zi⊕Zi+1) and the difference
(Zi − Zi+1) between two consecutive outputs are per-
formed. The results are summarized in Table 1.
In addition, we evaluate how an attacker might
predict an output if previous outputs are known. The
bit-byte prediction tests [23] used to evaluate the ran-
domness of the Konton2 stream cipher are employed
Table 1 Serial Correlation Test
Z = MixBits(X, Y )
Experiment Bit Byte 4-Byte
Zi 0.000024 -0.000089 0.000279
Zi ⊕ Zi+1 -0.000045 0.000026 0.000174
Zi − Zi+1 -0.000059 -0.000009 -0.000196
Table 2 Bit-Byte Prediction Tests for Randomness (Adapted
from [23])
Z = MixBits(X, Y )
Test Zi Zi ⊕ Zi+1 Zi − Zi+1
Bit Prediction Test A 0.0032 0.8446 0.8453
Bit Prediction Test B 0.1284 0.7925 0.7928
Bit Prediction Test C 0.4094 0.9735 0.9729
Bit Prediction Test D 0.7448 0.9690 0.9687
Bit Prediction Test E 0.2975 0.6758 0.6717
Byte Prediction Test A 0.3049 0.6919 0.6970
Byte Prediction Test B 0.8854 0.8551 0.8522
Byte Prediction Test C 0.8549 0.8246 0.8209
Byte Prediction Test D 0.1717 0.9493 0.9483
Byte Repetition Test 0.7289 0.0684 0.0685
for this purpose. Eight algorithms are used to predict
the value of each bit (resp. byte) from the beginning
to the end of the sequence. For a perfectly random
sequence, the probability of success of any of the al-
gorithms should be 1/2 (resp. 1/28). The number of
successes is counted, and a chi-squared statistic with 1
degree of freedom computed. Table 2 shows the results.
From our analysis, we find that MixBits has very
good properties. Indeed, our analysis shows that the
output of MixBits cannot be predicted significantly
better than a pure random guess if the adversary does
not have any knowledge of the secret access password.
That is, output sequence of MixBits is not polynomial
distinguishable from a truly random number.
7.2 Performance Analysis
The MitBits function only uses efficient operations and
combines triangular (i.e. addition mod 232) and non-
triangular functions (i.e. bitwise right/left shift) as re-
quirements 1 and 2 demand. Specifically, the necessary
architecture to implement this function can be divided
into three main modules: 1) Memory blocks where all
the 32-bit used variables are stored; 2) Arithmetic logic
Unit in which the addition mod 232 is supported; 3)
Additional logic used for control purpose. An estimate
of the gate count for MixBits can be easily obtained.
Six logic gates are needed for each bit added in par-
allel†. The registers will be implemented by means of
flip-flops, each of which requires 8 gate equivalents [24].
Specifically, two 32-bit registers are needed – one to
store the output Z and another for the intermediate
results. Hence, a total of around 740 gate equivalents
are needed to implement MixBits, considering that a
†
S = A ⊕ [B ⊕ CENT ] CSAL = BCENT + ACENT + AB
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Table 3 Performance Comparison
Cryptographic Gates Cycles per Throughput at Price
primitive Equivalent block 100 KHz (Kbps) (Cents)
Mixbits 740 128 25 K
Block ciphers
Present [28] 1,570 32 200 K + 0.83
DESL [29] 1,848 144 44.4 K + 1.12
HIGHT [30] 3,048 34 188.2 K + 2.31
AES [31] 3,400 1,032 12.4 K + 2.66
Stream ciphers
Grain-80 [32] 1,294 1 100 K + 0.51
Grain-80, x16 [32] 3,239 1 1,600 K + 2.50
Trivium [32] 2,599 1 100 K + 1.86
Trivium, x16 [32] 3,185 1 1,600 K + 2.44
Hash functions
MD5 [33] 8,400 612 20.91 K + 7.66
SHA-1 [34] 8,120 1,274 12.56 K + 7.38
SHA-256 [34] 10,868 1,128 22.69 K + 10.13
0.05 * (Memory block + Arithmetic logic Unit) is the
circuit area taken up by the control unit.
An estimate of the temporal requirements can also
be carried out. A tag has to spend around 128 clock
cycles to compute an output (Z = MixBits(X, Y )).
Assuming a clock frequency of 100 KHz , which is the
most common operation frequency for RF transponders
[25], a tag can compute around 780 updates per second.
Hence, the timing requirements (> 450 answers/sec)
are completely fulfilled.
To complete the analysis, a comparison with sev-
eral block/stream ciphers and hash functions is carried
out and the results shown in Table 3 (for the price com-
parison, MixBits is fixed as the reference and every
extra 1,000 gates is assumed to increase chip price by
$0.01 [26]). We find that MixBits is the most efficient
in circuit area and although throughput is not the high-
est, it is within the requirements of the intended appli-
cations (e.g. baggage tracking, electronic toll collection,
pallet tracking, etc.).
Lightweight ciphers such as Present or Grain re-
quire only 1,570 or 1,294 gate equivalents respectively.
However, this number of gates, even though small, may
still exceed the capabilities of tags conforming to Gen-
2 specification. Furthermore, where tag price is con-
cerned, slight differences in tag prices can be greatly
magnified under an operating environment where large
numbers of tags are deployed. Imagine for a company
that needs to deploy 500 million tags. A difference
of US $0.0051 – 0.0083 (Grain-Present) per tag would
amount to US $ 2,550,000 – 4,150,000 of extra costs
in total, which is a significant sum. In this case, us-
ing Grain or Present cipher could be rather expensive.
In addition, the above primitives can not take up the
whole of the circuit area devoted to security because a
significant number of logic gates has to be set aside for
the 16-bit PRNG supported on-chip and a PRNG con-
forming to Gen-2 specification requires around 1,600
gate equivalents [27]. While the use of a cipher or hash
function would increase the level of security, it would
also incur hardware costs. In this work, our main ob-
jective is to design a lightweight authentication pro-
tocol under the EPCglobal Framework, and requires
balancing tradeoffs between security and hardware re-
strictions. Summarizing, we find that our proposed
MixBits function performs reasonably well and pro-
vides an appropriate security level for tags compliant
with the EPC Class-1 Gen-2 specification.
8. Analysis of the M3AP Protocol
In this section, we provide a proof sketch to show that
our proposed M3AP protocol provides mutual authenti-
cation between a tag and a reader. In addition, we also
analyze the security of the protocol by examining how
the protocol fares against previous attacks exposed on
the TRMA schemes, as well as other passive and active
attacks.
8.1 Verification of Mutual Authentication.
In an RFID context, authentication serves the pur-
pose of validating and confirming the identities of tags
and/or readers. With proper authentication, illegiti-
mate readers and tags can then be identified from legit-
imate ones and the necessary action can then be taken
thereafter. Our proposed M3AP protocol have been de-
signed to incorporate both reader-to-tag authentication
(with CCP1 and CCP2) and tag-to-reader authentica-
tion (with CCP3 and CCP4). In this section, we show
that M3AP achieves these objectives.
Reader-to-Tag Authentication: The first two
messages of our proposed scheme allow a legitimate
reader that has knowledge of the tag’s access password
to authenticate itself to the tag. A malicious (or ille-
gitimate) reader does not possess the access password
to generate the corresponding responses (CCP1 and
CCP2). Due to lack of authorization for the illegiti-
mate reader, this information cannot be obtained from
the manufacturer (EPC-IS). In addition, the computa-
tion of CCP1 and CCP2 uses only random challenges
from the tag. In the original TRMA scheme, CCP1
and CCP2 are computed from random values gener-
ated by the tag, as well as random values generated
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by the reader. However, this provides an avenue for
an illegitimate reader to specify the random values in
such a way that allows it to circumvent the scheme and
forge a successful authentication more easily. By having
the reader compute the authentication responses based
solely on random challenges generated by the tag and
the shared secret (the tag access password), our scheme
eliminates such a weakness.
Tag-to-Reader Authentication: The third message
of our scheme is for a legitimate tag to authenticate it-
self to the reader after it has confirmed that the reader
is a legitimate one. A fraudulent tag does not possess
the access password that is necessary to compute the
cover-codes (CCP3 and CCP4). In this case, cover-
codes only depend on the random numbers picked by
the genuine reader and avoids the vulnerability in the
original TRMA scheme whereby the attacker has con-
trol over the inputs required to compute the authentica-
tion response. Hence, without knowledge of the correct
access password, a tag impersonation attack cannot be
successful and authentication would fail.
The following Lemma highlights the fact that the
security level for this scheme is bounded by 2−32. Note
that access and kill passwords are 32-bits conforming
to Gen-2 specification. Indeed, the proposed scheme
represents a trade of between security and keeping the
scheme under the EPCglobal framework, instead of us-
ing a more demanding resources and completely secure
solution (e.g. hash-based RFID protocol).
Lemma. The security of the M3AP protocol against
an adversary A making at most qrt or qtr queries is




A = max{qrt · SuccCCP1&CCP2(l), (8)
qtr · SuccCCP3&CCP4(l)}









232 and qrt/qtr symbolizes the number of queries sent
by an adversary to the tag/reader respectively.
8.2 Resistance against Previous Attacks on TRMA
Resistance against the Correlation Attack. In or-
der to perform the correlation attack described in [9],
the adversary first needs to find a correlation between
the access password PWD and the MixBits output
(PWD′ and PWD′′). Once this is found, the adver-
sary can make use of the relationships derived in [9]
(the relationships between PWD and the output of
PadGen, where in our new scheme, PadGen is ap-
plied to PWD′ and PWD′′ instead of PWD) to attack
the scheme. However, as witnessed in the last section,
we have shown that it is highly difficult to obtain any
correlation between the input and output of MixBits.
Hence, we contend that our proposed scheme provides
strong resistance against the correlation attack.
Resistance against the Dictionary Attack. In the
original TRMA scheme, the value of each bit of the
authentication response CCPi (i = {1, 2, 3, 4}) is only
dependent on the value of a particular hex-digit in RTagi
or RRdri . For example, the first bit of CCP1 depends
on the first hex-digit of RTag1 . If the value of a hex-
digit in any RTagi or R
Rdr
i is repeated (i.e. it had the
same value in a previous authentication session), then
the adversary would be able to successfully predict the
value for the corresponding bit in Ri to forge a success-
ful authentication. In our proposed scheme, we find
that each bit in any Ri is dependent on all four 16-bit
random numbers generated by the tag and the reader.
For example, each bit in CCP1 or CCP2 is dependent






2 . This is be-
cause all of them are involved in the computation of
PWD′ in MixBits. Moreover, the nature of MixBits
ensures that the bits of the four random numbers are
diffused within PWD′. In order to successfully predict
the value of a bit in CCP1 or CCP2, the adversary must
encounter a situation whereby all four random numbers
contain the same values that have appeared together in
a previous session. The probability of this occurring
is extremely low, since with a total of 64 bits between
them, the number of possible combinations amounts to
264. Hence, the dictionary attack is still possible but
becomes extremely difficult. In fact, this attack can be
completely prevented if we update or refresh the access
password after every authentication session. For exam-
ple, we can change the access password from PWD to
PWD′′ at the end of the protocol after both parties are
mutually authenticated. The new access password will
then be used for the next authentication session, and
so on.
Resistance against the Tag Killing Attack. Un-
like the extended TRMA scheme, the kill password is
not used in our proposed authentication scheme. Fur-
thermore, all messages exchanged during the protocol
are independent of the kill password of the commu-
nicating tag. Hence, an adversary would not be able
to gather any information about the kill password of
tags from authentication sessions under our proposed
scheme.
8.3 Resistance against Other Attacks
Resistance against Replay Attacks. In a replay
attack, the adversary eavesdrops on the messages ex-
changed between a legitimate reader and a legitimate
tag, and replays the authentication responses to mas-
querade as the reader or the tag. Such an attack would
be successful only if all the four random challenges have
appeared together and in the right sequence in a previ-
ous authentication session. With the legitimate parties
generating fresh random challenges for each authenti-
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cation session, the probability of success for a replay
attack would be extremely low ( 1/264).
Resistance against Offline Brute Force Attacks.
In an offline brute force attack, an adversary eavesdrops
on a single pass (for example, the reader-to-tag authen-
tication) of an authentication session to obtain a set
of random challenges and the valid response based on
those challenges. Next, the adversary assumes a value
for the access password and computes a response based
on the collected challenges (by executing the MixBits
function, the PadGen function, and other necessary op-
erations). If the computed response matches with the
collected response, then the value assumed for the ac-
cess password was correct. Otherwise, the adversary
tries the next probable value for the access password,
repeating until a correct match is found. The complex-
ity of this attack is O(2l), where l is the number of bits
in the access password. To offer adequate resistance
against such an attack, l should be sufficiently large,
yet not so large as to violate constraints in the tag im-
plementation. We note that under the Gen-2 standard,
l = 32 bits and this may not be sufficient to thwart an
attack where computations are carried out on a PC.
Resistance against Active Brute Force Attacks.
Active brute force attacks generally require an adver-
sary to actively take part in the authentication proto-
col by masquerading as a tag or a reader. A number
of scenarios are possible. In the first scenario, an ad-
versary can programme a malicious reader/tag to re-
peatedly probe a legitimate tag/reader. During each
authentication attempt, the reader/tag tries a different
value for the access password. This continues until the
adversary authenticates successfully to the tag/reader.
In another scenario, an adversary can iteratively issue
challenges to the legitimate reader and record valid sets
of challenges and responses to form a dictionary. Both
attacks can be made infeasible with sufficiently large
access passwords and random challenges, or the use of
password updating.
Resistance against De-synchronization Attacks.
Under our proposed scheme, since the access password
is constant, there is no threat of de-synchronization.
However, as discussed earlier, to completely prevent
some of the attacks, it would be necessary to update
the access password at the end of each successful mu-
tual authentication. In this case, the copies of the ac-
cess password kept at the tag and the reader (or the
back-end database, as in most cases) must be the same
at all times, i.e. they must be synchronized. Once any
party fails to update its copy of the access password at
the end of a successful authentication session, both par-
ties will be de-synchronized. Hence, with password up-
dating, extra measures may need to be taken to ensure
that the protocol is robust against de-synchronization.
Resistance against Skimming Attacks. In a
skimming attack, an adversary reads the contents of
a legitimate tag and copies those contents over to the
target tag (the clone). For an RFID tag that complies
with the EPC Class-1 Gen-2 standard, the access pass-
word of the tag would be stored in protected memory
and cannot be revealed through skimming. The only
contents that could be copied to the clone are the EPC
and the data stored in the unprotected memory. These
information would not be sufficient for the cloned tag
to perform a successful authentication. Hence, our pro-
tocol is resistant against unauthorized skimming.
Resistance against Reverse Engineering. For
reverse engineering, we assume that the adversary is
equipped with the expertise to disclose contents stored
in both the unprotected and protected memory of the
tag. Possible methods used could include probing, fault
injection, power and timing analysis, etc. Obviously,
the low-cost EPC Class-1 Gen-2 tags would be vulner-
able to a highly skilled adversary who is well-versed in
reverse engineering techniques. With all the tag con-
tents disclosed, the adversary can forge a successful au-
thentication with a legitimate reader. However, since
the access password for each tag is expected to be differ-
ent, the adversary would only be able to masquerade as
the compromised tag and not other tags. This attack
could be rather expensive to launch on a large scale
tag constellation and may not be cost-effective since
the benefits reaped to the adversary are highly likely
to outweigh the costs incurred.
Resistance against Unauthorized Tracking. As
mentioned earlier, privacy is not a focus in this work
and the current EPCglobal Framework does not seem
to address privacy issues. The transmission of the EPC
in clear implies that unauthorized tracking of tags is
possible. We contend that it is possible to integrate
previously proposed methods with our scheme to guard
against privacy violation. For example, the EPC can
be replaced with a pseudonym (as proposed in [35]) or
be relabelled (as in [36]) to prevent tracking of the tag.
The EPC can also be protected using masking or RF
jamming techniques (e.g. [37]), or through controls pro-
vided by an RFID proxy device (e.g. [38]). Naturally,
implementing these solutions for privacy protection in-
curs in higher costs on the resulting system.
9. Conclusions
In this paper, a new authentication protocol named
M3AP and based on the protocol of Konidala et al.,
is proposed. The security deficiencies in [3] were cor-
rected in M3AP with the introduction of the complex
but lightweight MixBits function. MixBits has been
obtained by means of Genetic Programming. Its secu-
rity and performance has been studied in some depth.
In addition, a security analysis of the whole M3AP pro-
tocol has been accomplished, and we find that there is
greater resistance against common attacks. In conclu-
sion, we expect that our M3AP protocol can help to
increase the security level of EPC Class-1 Gen-2 / ISO
10
IEICE TRANS. INF. & SYST., VOL.Exx–D, NO.xx XXXX 200x
18000-6C specification.
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